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Introduction 
Many of the methodology textbooks that business and management students are encouraged to 
use a simple and, in our view, flawed dichotomy between objectivist (positivist, deductive, and 
empiricist) approaches, which are typically aligned with quantitative empirical methods, and 
subjectivist (social constructionist, inductive, and interpretive) approaches, which are typically 
aligned with qualitative empirical methods. Whilst this dichotomy certainly simplifies 
approaches to research, it is based on the odd assumption that some data should a priori, be 
ruled out simply on the basis of whether it is appropriate and consonant with the general 
orientation of the approach. Such as assumption is not only, as we discuss later,  theoretically 
flawed, but is also out of kilter with the day to day experiences of individuals: counting can 
often give us insights into meaning or values (for example when suicide rates rise), and 
interpreting sights and sounds can give us greater understanding of an external and objective 
reality (think about all the signs drivers respond to when obeying "the rules of the road", for 
example). 
Critical realist scholars seek to overcome this odd dualism (objectivism or subjectivism) by 
distinguishing between ontology (what is real) and epistemology (what we know). CR scholars 
assume the existence of an objective (‘intransitive’) world that has powers and properties that 
can be more accurately known as a consequence of scientific endeavour but recognise that 
knowledge is a subjective, discursively bound (i.e. transitive) and constantly changing social 
construction. Crucially, for science, social science, and for the purposes of this chapter, careful 
methodological practices form a bridge between our epistemological knowledge and 
ontological reality: good research means we can understand the world better. This marriage of 
epistemological relativism and ontological realism, however, presents novel challenges to 
qualitative social scientists, not least of which is the question of how researchers make 
discoveries about any social formation from qualitative datasets when participants may be 
unaware of or (consciously or otherwise) misrepresent the social formations of which they are 
a part.  
In our view, dealing with this problem requires qualitative researchers to think about the 
research act in particular and in theoretically grounded ways (see also, Edwards et al. 2014). In 
this chapter we attempt to distil the general thrust of an emerging and developing stream of CR 
informed qualitative research. We begins by offering a brief introduction to CR as a philosophy 
of science before then sketching out the implications of this position for qualitative researchers. 
The overall argument suggests CR researchers can and should embrace all qualitative (and 
many quantitative) techniques. Indeed, they often must do so in order to understand social 
organisation. However, their approach to data collection and analysis is likely to differ 
significantly from those who are committed to alternative ontological positions.   
 
Critical Realist Ontology 
The origin of CR, as a philosophy of science, is attributed to a series of books by Roy Bhaskar 
(Bhaskar 1975, Bhaskar 1979, Bhaskar 2008, Bhaskar 1993). He argues that the universe, 
including the social world, is a stratified and open system of emergent entities. This section 
breaks this mouthful down into simple parts in the effort to clarify its meaning, so if you are 
already familiar with this ontological position you might want to skip forwards to the next 
section.  
 
Entities, Powers and Systems 
Entities are things which ‘make a difference’ in their own right, rather than as mere sums of 
their parts (Fleetwood 2005: 199). Molecules, individuals and organizations are all entities, 
even though one may be (partially) comprised of others. Entities may be material (e.g. water), 
immaterial (e.g. class) or both (e.g. a contract). Bhaskar differentiates between ‘real essences’ 
which are the ‘structures or constitutions in virtue of which [a] thing or substance tends to 
behave the way it does’ (Bhaskar, 2008: 209), and ‘nominal essences’ which are ‘those 
properties the manifestation of which are necessary for the thing to be correctly identified as 
one of a certain type’ (Bhaskar, 2008: 279). Such a distinction enables a separation of the 
essential generative or enabling processes of an entity and its epiphenomenal features. We may 
this identify a book nominally, as paper bound together in a particular way,   or in a more 
sophisticated way in terms of its language, genre, intended audience or purpose, to realise the 
real essence of the specific book observed. 
Entities may also be real in different ways and at different levels. For example, the bogeyman 
is not materially, but ideationally real: the discourses about him have real effects not least on 
the bedtime activities of children and on the writers of children's fiction. The bogeyman thus 
exists as a conceptual/cultural schema in some societies, which affects social and material 
events. Entities are thus organized hierarchically, in that they exist and have relations at 
different levels. For example, the entity ‘organization’ is made up from (among other things) 
people and resources; people are (partially) constructed of tissue and organs; which are, in turn,  
made up of cells, and so on.  
The relationship between these levels is known as ‘emergence’  (Elder-Vass 2010), where one 
level is dependent upon, but irreducible to the level below: for example, we cannot understand 
the wetness of water in reference to its components of hydrogen and oxygen; nor can we explain 
the functioning of an organisation with sole reference to its roles and resources. Each entity at 
different levels has causal powers that depend on the relational properties of its parts. These 
relational properties, which are inherent to entities, can be usefully conceived of as essences. 
An essence is ‘what makes something that thing and not something else’ (O’Mahoney 
2011:726). Water, is H2O and has the power to soak, organizations have directors and the power 
to employ; money has legal status and has the power to purchase1.  
The notions of causal powers of entities are important because change often occurs when the 
powers of one entity interact with another: water can be heated by fire, teams may elect a leader, 
and organizations might be bought by other organizations. Such mechanisms often transform 
entities: water might turn into steam, a new leader might change the organisation, and a 
purchased organization might be asset-stripped. So, changed and/or emergent entities, created 
from the interactions of entities and causal powers, will often have new properties and powers. 
We should note here the different ways in which a power may exist: An entity may possess a 
power simply due to its properties (a government may have some power to increase 
employment); this power may be exercised by the power being triggered (the government takes 
on more public sector workers); yet this power may or may not be actualized (i.e. come to be) 
                                                     
1Although we need to be careful when using terms like ‘essence’ and ‘power’, it is important to note that without some idea that an entity 
has one or more essences or powers it is indistinguishable from anything else. 
because there may be countervailing powers, (e.g. private sector employment may have 
collapsed). The social world is full of powers, the actualization of which is often retarded by 
other powers within the open systems in which they are located.  
Any power necessitates the actualisation (manifestation, existence) of at least one mechanism 
for the potential exercise of that power: the possessed power of an employer to sack a worker 
implies a mechanism (legal termination of a contract) by which this occurs. Powers thus depend 
on mechanisms that relate an entity to another. The exercising of powers often results in 
tendencies which, in the social world, may manifest in patterns of events. However, unlike the 
natural sciences, these patterns are not reliable event regularities, and their existence alone can 
certainly not be taken to ‘prove’ one theory or another, as we know that powers are often 
unexercised, or unactualised. This framing is important because it allows a conceptualisation 
of what could happen, what should happen  and what isn’t happening, which gives the 
researcher prompts for further investigation. For example, when women dominate a highly paid 
employment sector, global temperatures decrease, or low paid workers are happy, it indicates 
that there are (perhaps) deficiencies in our current theorisations or methods which need 
attention. Moreover, as Bhaskar (2008) argues, critical realism also allows a conceptualisation 
of absences which accords causal powers: the absence of legislation on worker rights, for 
example, has real effects which empiricist and constructionist accounts of the world might 
miss.  
For CR scholars, explanatory power is to be found in understanding how different entities are 
related as parts of a greater whole: to really understand what a heart or a coin is, for example, 
it is necessary to place it in the context of the body or the monetary system. This is where the 
term open system becomes useful. In contrast to a closed system, such as a laboratory, social 
mechanisms cannot be isolated and thus repeated in an identical manner to facilitate 
experimentation. Whilst such isolation is impossible in the social world, critical realists often 
use the concept of the ‘laminated system’ (Bhaskar 1993; Elder-Vass 2010) ‘whose internal 
elements are necessarily ‘bonded’ in a multiplicity of structures’ (Bhaskar 1993: 25). Examples 
might include financialised capitalism, the Russian legal system, or British worker strikes: 
whilst these cannot be separated from the rest of society, they comprise systems, mechanisms 
and entities which are important to consider together. 
 
The empirical, the actual, the real 
In the introduction, we saw how critical realism commits to both ontological realism and 
epistemological relativism, yet the picture is more complicated than this, as critical realism, 
whilst accepting that actual events do occur, also proposes that these events are caused by real 
mechanisms that are often invisible to the researcher. This stratified  or ‘depth ontology’ makes 
a distinction between the ‘empirical’, the 'actual' and the 'real'. The empirical is what we 
perceive to be the case: human sensory experiences and perceptions (we observe a driver 
approaching a the speed camera and slowing down). The ‘actual’ is the events that occur in 
space and time, which may be different to what we perceive to be the case (we may assume the 
driver has slowed down before the speed camera when this is not what happened). The real or 
deep is constituted of the mechanisms and structures which generate (and explain) events, a 
point which we shall illustrate below. 
This stratified conception of causation facilitates a more adequate understanding of how 
(material and social) powers which operate in different locations and/or, often, at different 
hierarchical levels are related. Reality is ‘multiply determined’, with no single mechanism 
determining events (Bhaskar 1975). Multiple causes must be teased out from detailed 
explorations of the setting, and so it follows that a key commitment of critical realist research 
is that there are deeper levels awaiting discovery. Beyond direct observation it is also possible 
to posit various other potential mechanisms that may be (in part or whole) neither manifest nor 
readily observable, but that still have an effect.  
To put all this CR terminology into a brief example, we might refer to a fixed roadside speed 
camera, which routinely slows down the traffic regardless of whether the camera within it is 
actually working. A traditional Humean or positivist approach might measure the incidence of 
new speed cameras (working or not) and the changes in speed of cars, and undertake a 
regression analysis to show, for example, that a positive correlation means that cameras cause 
speed retardation. Whilst the numbers here can be (though are not necessarily) useful, the 
analysis contains inadequate conceptualisation of cause’ which focuses on description rather 
than explanation. Crucially, it misses out on the most complex element in the processes: the 
human. An alternative, post-structural approach might emphasise the self-disciplining 
Foucauldian effects of disciplinary surveillance, and the role such technology has in producing 
compliant subjects (for example, Fyfe and Bannister 1996). This perspective can produce 
useful insights, but when discourse is over-emphasised, and the self is seen as constructed, then 
resistance, social structure, and the wider historical context can be missed.  
A critical realist perspective, however, not only accepts the distinction between the empirical 
(the appearance of a speed camera) and the actual (a speed camera with no film), but also seeks 
to discover the (deep) causal mechanisms that relate the appearance of the camera with the 
person, asking what variety of causal relations must exist in order for the empirical events to 
occur. This not only opens up a wider variety of interesting phenomena, such as the mind of 
the driver, the powers of the police, and the braking mechanisms of cars, but also helps us 
understand why things might change: for example when speeds slowly increase when drivers 
realise the camera doesn’t flash, or when the camera gets vandalised because people think 
cameras are simply a mechanism for extorting fees. The critical realist approach, therefore, can 
place the speed camera in a number of related, stratified ‘laminated systems’ - which might 
include both the structural relations of the citizen, the state and the police, as well as the 
psychological institutionalisation of drivers and their responses (and resistance) to disciplinary 
techniques – which rely upon the identification of deep causal relations which may be invisible 
to the researcher focused merely on actual events.  
 
 
Critical Realist Research 
 
An Underpinning Ontology 
The example above highlights an obvious limitation of critical realism: it is a metaphysical 
ontology and (contrary to some writing) does not  imply anything about the existence of the 
self, society, social structures and so on. To achieve a critical realist account of such things we 
need to develop and use what Cruickshank (2003) refers to as ‘domain specific’ theories. These 
emerge when general CR realist theory is drawn upon to develop a framework for studying a 
specific empirical domain, and the consequence is that the theories that are developed, whilst 
adhering to the principles and language of CR, are only implicitly ontological. For example, 
those studying labour process theory might use critical realism as an ‘underlabourer’ to build 
theories concerning the exploitation or alienation of workers  however, there is nothing in a 
critical realist ontology which demands such propositions. Indeed, the epistemological 
relativism inherent in CR means that one would expect such theories to be at best 
approximations of reality, not least because all social theorising involves simplification. 
Applied critical realism, therefore, provides an underpinning structure and language to guide 
good research by asking what the entities, causal powers, dependencies and relations are, but 
it does not specify what these should be. The task of the researcher, then, is to work out a better 
and causally accurate, correct, or reliable explanation for these patterns of events via the 
development of more adequate (and domain specific) accounts of the powers, entities, 
mechanisms and relations which created them. However, as we saw with the example of the 
speed camera, developing such an explanation can be difficult because the powers of entities 
do not have to be present or even exerted in order to have an effect.  
One consequence of both the ‘domain agnosticism’ and stratified nature of critical realism is 
that it is compatible with a wide array of other theoretical (though not ontological) positions. 
For example, critical realists are comfortable with the domain level concepts of discourse, 
identity or materiality (Elder-Vass 2014, Mutch 2013), though clearly not with the ontological 
positions that discourse is everything or that the material is entirely social (e.g. Barad 2007). 
This provides critical realists with great opportunities to re-examine competing ontological 
positions or theorists, that make important theoretical insights, but are often limited by 
ontological strictures. Such approaches have not only led to many critical realist re-readings of 
concepts such as discourse (Fairclough 2005), identity (O'Mahoney 2011) and socio-
materiality (Mutch 2013), but also to claim theorists such as Foucault and Derrida as critical 
realists (Wright 2004, Pearce and Woodiwiss 2001). 
 
Mechanisms, Contexts, Outcomes 
In seeking to understand and explain the mechanisms behind empirical and actual events, 
critical realism is primarily interested in causal explanations – moving from the what to the 
why. This challenges the researcher, the policy maker or the manager to develop deep 
understandings of the worlds in which they inhabit: away from the simplistic certainty of 
regression analyses, that might show implementing X ‘causes’ Y, and towards an 
understanding of why different contexts, conditions, and aspects of X can cause Y. The key to 
this enquiry is the ‘mechanism’ and the events that it produces, but the mechanism in an open 
system cannot be isolated from its context, hence Pawson and Tilly’s (1997) equation, 
Mechanism + Context  = Outcome. In more detail:  
 Mechanism: how do the properties of one or more entities affect those of others? 
 Context: what conditions are needed for an entity’s causal mechanisms be to triggered? 
 Outcomes: what are the empirical manifestations produced by causal mechanisms being 
triggered in a given context? 
The role of context means that, unlike the image promoted by positivists, there are no clear, 
simple or easy answers in the social world (Fleetwood and Hesketh 2010). For example, we 
might find that low-waged service workers working in a call centre can be happy when they 
work on quality services, have high levels of discretion in their jobs, and positively identify 
with the values of their work (Jenkins and Delbridge 2014). The mechanisms that manifested 
here concerned the relational identifications of the workers with the values of their employer 
and their work. However, the authors make clear that the context of this mechanism was a 
labour market in which there was limited choice, a family-owned, small and successful 
business, and the identified mechanisms may produce different outcomes in different contexts, 
even within the same company at a different time. 
 
CR Research Design 
The centrality of identifying mechanisms to explain why things happen means that critical 
realists put theory first. Thus, the aim of realist research design is to produce explanations 
(theories) about the essences (properties) and exercise of transfactual, hidden, and often 
universal mechanisms. This takes any potential generalisations from the empirical to the 
theoretical, in contrast to the positivist approach where generalizations are only concerned with 
an empirical population (Danermark 2002: 77). This distinction is important because 
theoretical generalizations are more enduring and can be applied through time and space: a 
theoretical generalization that capitalism tends to commodify should not only be applicable in 
all forms of capitalism (including future ones), but when one finds empirical evidence to the 
contrary, it prompts the researcher to seek further mechanisms that might be at play to prevent 
the mechanism being actualized. In contrast, a generalization that notes only the empirical 
instances of capitalist commodification is a much thinner proposition that has limited 
explanatory value because it simply identifies the empirical event and says little about why is 
happens, to what extent, and in which circumstances. Moreover, evidence to the contrary 
simply modifies the generalization and does not prompt a pursuit of counter-mechanisms. 
The importance of CR emphasising ontological questions (what is X? how does it work?) over 
epistemological questions (how can we know X?) means that CR is methodologically 
ecumenical. Indeed, many realists would argue that the emergent stratified nature of social 
reality means that a wide range of methodological approaches or ‘extended methods’ is 
necessary for a richer conceptualisation of the mechanisms at work in the social world. For this 
reason, CR scholars embrace a range of qualitative research techniques. Our own edited 
collection (Edwards, O'Mahoney and Vincent, 2014), which looked at the implications of CR 
for a range of methods within the field of organisation studies, included chapters on discourse 
analysis (Sims-Schouten and Riley 2014), grounded theory (Kempster and Perry 2014), 
interviewing (Smith and Elger 2014), ethnography (Rees and Gatenby 2014), case studies 
(Vincent and Wapshott 2013), comparative case methods (Kessler and Bach 2014), action 
research (Ram et al. 2014), historical and documentary methods (Mutch 2014). Elsewhere CR 
scholars have used observational (Bøllingtoft 2007), diary-based (Næss and Jensen 2002) and 
autoethnographical (Botterill 2003) methods.  
 
Table 1  Critical Realist Research Strategies (amended from Ackroyd and Karlsson 
   2014) 
 
 Intensive   Extensive 
 What is the 
mechanism? 
How do context & 
mechanism typically 
interact? 
How do context & 
mechanism 
historically interact? 
What is the 
context? 
Detached Case-study Comparative case-
study 
Institutional / 
historical analysis 
Surveys 
Engaged Action 
research 
Intensive realist 
literature evaluations 
Barefoot research Extensive realist 
evaluation 
 
As (Ackroyd and Karlsson (2015)) have argued, the choice of research design for critical 
realists very much depends on the position of one’s research purpose on two dimensions. The 
first, relates to the focus of research, and ranges from intensive research to extensive research. 
Intensive research prioritises qualitative research designs, such as case-studies or action 
research, where the context is known and the mechanism is unknown (for example, why are 
workers happy in this factory?). Extensive research examines the effect of different contexts 
on a mechanism, for example by using surveys (see also, Sayer 1997). The greater breadth of 
data can imply relationships quantitatively, but also generate taxonomies. It is suitable for 
where mechanisms are known (or at least inferred) but the context varies (for example, in what 
contexts does greater worker autonomy lead to greater levels of reported happiness?). Between 
these two extremes are examples of where the focus of study is on the interaction of 
mechanisms and contexts. A second scale, concerns the extent of detachment of the researcher, 
whether they are simply diagnosing from a distance or whether they are trying to manipulate 
the mechanism or context under study. In Table 1, we amend Ackroyd and Karsson’s categories 
to re-present eight CR research strategies. This provides us with eight research designs that are 
described and illustrated briefly below. 
 
Table 2  CR Research Strategies, Explanations and Examples. 
 
Research 
Strategy 
Explanation Examples 
Case-study The most common, and arguably most useful, 
form of CR research. In-depth exploration of a 
case to abduct causal mechanisms from their 
empirical manifestations. Cases may range 
from people to companies to whole economies.  
Gouldner (1964); Beynon 
(1979) (1973); Burawoy 
(1979) 
Action 
research 
Intervention by researchers to explore the 
workings of a mechanism by triggering it or 
changing its context. 
Cassell and Johnson 
(2006); Friedman and 
Rogers (2009); Morgan 
and Olsen (2008) 
Comparative 
case-study 
Exploring how similar mechanisms operate in 
different contexts.  
Delbridge (1998); Taylor 
and Bain (2003); 
Kirkpatrick et al. (2005) 
Intensive 
realist 
literature 
evaluations. 
Builds theories to explain what mechanisms 
work in different contexts by reviewing the 
extant literature. 
Marchal et al. (2012);  
Institutional / 
historical 
analysis 
Examining causal sequences over time to 
explore how mechanisms and contexts interact 
over time, and the conditions for such 
interaction. 
Smith and Meiksins 
(1995);  Clark (2012), 
Mutch (2007). 
 
Barefoot 
research 
Training / encouraging participants / 
employees  to do their own research. 
Lindqvist (1979) 
Surveys Primarily focuses on descriptive statistics (eg. 
sampling or population data) to illustrate the 
empirical consequences or conditions of 
mechanisms. Occasionally used to prompt 
explanatory investigations, but in conjunction 
with other methods.  
Cully et al. (1999)  
Extensive 
realist 
evaluation 
Mixed methods: stage one uses qualitative 
work to identify causal mechanisms. Stage 2 
uses statistical techniques to examine how 
different contexts affect a mechanism.  
(Kazi et al. (2002), Kazi 
(2003)) 
 
CR Data Collection Methods 
There is little to say about CR methods, because they do not exist. As detailed earlier, CR has 
a highly ecumenical approach to data collection and holds that methodological choices should 
‘depend on the nature of the object of study and what one wants to learn about it’ (Sayer 2000: 
19). Thus, whilst CR work is often based on case-study research using interviews and 
ethnography, it has also involved observation, focus groups, literature reviews and surveys.  
One caveat that is rarely commented with either research designs or methods is the extent to 
which the phenomenon being studied can be isolated. It is true that in the social world this is 
probably futile, but many disciplines which are increasingly turning to critical realism, such as 
psychology (Ponterotto 2005) the focus of study may be mechanisms which are more capable 
of being isolated, at least at one level, than others. This raises interesting questions about the 
extent to which experimental design may be appropriate, perhaps as part of a mixed methods 
study. As critical realism is still a relatively nascent topic, we hope to see developments on this 
and other questions by other researchers. 
 Analytical method: Abduction and Retroduction 
As far as analysis is concerned, whilst both induction and deduction are used in critical realist 
research, the need to move from the empirical to the real (causal mechanisms) means that the 
emphasis tends to be on abduction and retroduction. Abduction involves re-description of 
findings as a causal mechanism or process which serves to explain them. The step involves re-
describing that which is observed (interviews, observation, documents) in terms of theory in 
order to describe the sequence of causation that gives rise to observed regularities in the pattern 
of events. It involves combining observations, often in tandem with theory identified in the 
literature review, to produce the most plausible explanation of the mechanisms that caused the 
events. For example, a researcher looking at HR practices might interview a group of workers 
about their appraisal and seek to explain these data in terms of theory about disciplinary power 
of managerial discourses (what is said in the appraisal situation) in the employment 
relationship, wherein it is theoretically assumed that the bargaining position of the appraisee 
(worker) is weaker than their appraiser (manager). Here, and if the explanation of the 
mechanisms is successful, theory and data will be consistently and effectively ‘fitted together’ 
in such a way as to render the nature of the mechanism clearer. 
Retroduction involves imagining a mechanism, which, if it were real, would account for the 
phenomena in question. In other words, it seeks to ascertain what the world (i.e. the broader 
context) must be like in order for the mechanisms we observe to be as they are and not 
otherwise. This often involves first identifying patterns over periods of time and in different 
contexts to creatively asking ‘what if?’ to identify often hidden causal mechanisms. For 
example, extending the example used above, we might observe (1) that some managerial 
discourses are more persuasive than others, and (2) that in certain organizational contexts 
(opportunity structures, labour markets, etc.) workers are more inclined to accept the 
managerial version of ‘the truth’, however this might be constructed. This, in turn, suggests a 
number of other causal processes are also at play to affect the mechanism observed, suggesting 
the opportunity to understand more about the relationship between the mechanisms we 
observed and the contexts in which it operates. 
In order to build better explanations of the interconnections between strata which might explain 
such variance within a known mechanism, we must either bring in or develop other theoretical 
resources. For example, we might use comparative analysis to demonstrate that it is those 
appraisers who are able to transpose the dominant cultural tropes of their appraisees into the 
appraisal meetings who prove to be the most persuasive. As a result, we might develop a new 
theory that connects the organizational outcomes with broader cultural contexts. Alternatively, 
and drawing on existing theory, we might consider the nature of opportunity structures within 
the broader labour market in order to explain why it is that, say, managerial trainees and those 
with an interest in opportunities for further technical training have a greater interest in being 
complicit with managerial discourses than, say, those with little opportunity for career 
advancement. In either case, new lines can be drawn between the operation of a mechanism, at 
one level, with the context(s) within which the mechanism resides. As different theories 
emphasize different aspects of mechanisms that are simultaneously implicated in a pattern of 
events, retroduction implies a commitment to theoretical pluralism, at least at the outset of an 
investigation. Multiple theoretical lenses can be considered for what they tell us about the 
various and stratified influences that are affecting the things we observe. 
Abduction and retroduction can also be used as part of an immanent critique of a competing 
position in order to develop theorising in a field. This provides a critique from within a 
theoretical position and identifies contradictions, ambiguities or inconsistencies. It seeks the 
‘Achilles heel’ (Bhaskar and Hartwig 2010) of an existing theoretical position in order to 
identify theoretical weaknesses that require further investigation. For example, Archer 
undertakes an immanent critique of conceptions of the social agent within economics and 
social-constructionists sociology to demonstrate the need for a new theory about the ways in 
which humans are conditioned by, but irreducible to, social norms and structures. This then 
spurs Archer’s (2000) investigation and development of a theory of humans which incorporates 
the notion of morphogenetic cycle and the subjects ‘inner dialogue’. In undertaking an 
immanent critique a critical realist research may seek to ameliorate the flaws they discover by 
asking what the theory could be like in order to overcome its inconsistencies and re-describing 
the theoretical tools of the position within an alternative (in this case, critical realist) theory. 
For example, O’Mahoney (2011) shows that the anti-essentialist positions of many anti-
essentialist scholars are inconsistent with their own practices and theorising. He uses this flaw 
to redescribe their main theoretical commitments (for example, concerning identity and 
discourse) within a critical realist ontology. 
Thus, when abduction and retroduction succeed, they offer a new and often unanticipated view 
of things: what was hitherto unobserved becomes the basis of new understanding. By 
postulating a new view of the object of study in the light of a new or existing theorization. A 
successful realist study, therefore, involves a re-conceptualization of the subject and the 
processes to which it is connected. Finally, it should be noted that many researchers, for 
simplicity, treat abduction and retroduction as one movement, often from qualitative data to 
the best theory that explains the data (Mingers 2006, Ketokivi et al. 2010). As we believe that 
abduction necessitates some form of retroduction, and vice versa, we do not disagree with this 
combination. 
 
An exemplar analysis 
One qualitative CR study that uses abduction, retroduction and multiple theoretical lenses is 
Vincent (2008). This study wanted to understand more about the way in which how public 
sector organisations procured complex goods from private sector suppliers, and so it came to 
focus on an exemplar case: a ‘strategic partnership’ between Govco (a large and bureaucratic 
government department) and Futuretech (a multinational business software development 
specialist). This Partnership became the focus of a case study and a range of qualitative data 
collection methods, including interviews, observation and documentary analysis was used to 
abduct the partnership as an inter-organisational mechanisms.  
Initial interviews indicated that the Partnership was created because Govco was interested in 
accessing Futuretech stock of in-house technology and expertise. Futuretech, on the other hand, 
wanted to make a profit from the arrangement. A contract was agreed, which stipulated 
(amongst other things) that the cost of a unity of IT systems development should halve over 
five years, with Futuretech benefitting (financially) where performance exceeded these 
expectation. The analysis came to focus on how this contract was managed, with subsequent 
interviews, observation and documentary analysis focused on this concern. 
These data indicated that a group of senior IT experts and managers were employed, by both 
organisations, to manage the contract. These managers knew a great deal about technological 
possibilities, capabilities, and susceptibilities of both organisations. They met regularly to 
defining the work Futuretech would deliver and, subsequently, they were responsible for 
ensuring that it was delivered to contractual targets. As such, the Partnership had a good deal 
of latitude to decide what ‘good performance’ looked like (even if most respondents didn't say 
so). Some more junior managers admitted that, as there was no easy yardstick with which to 
measure time sent developing IT systems, some technologies were much easier to deliver than 
others. Others hinted that, where performance dipped below contractual expectations any 
underperformance could be reconciled against easier-to-deliver work. In the end, contractual 
targets were consistently delivered, but it little evidence to confirm whether performance was 
good or bad. 
In some ways the Partnership appeared to be effective: it hit contractual targets and IT user 
surveys showed improved perceptions of performance. In interviews, senior personnel boasts 
about the cordiality of relations. All were committed to Futuretech's profitability and had a 
strong interest in the contract to be being a "success" (future careers depended on it!). However, 
there was also evidence that performance was less than effective - some respondents 
complained about the effectiveness of the technologies delivered and suggested that, over time, 
Futuretech delivered increasingly ‘off-the-peg’ rather than more complex and challenging 
‘bespoke’ technologies. Ultimately, it is likely to have been more generally recognised that the 
Partnership was failing to deliver as effectively as it might (the contract was not renewed after 
the five-year term ended). 
In this case abduction from qualitative data revealed the Partnership, as a set of inter-
organisational meetings that negotiated contractual details. However, the many questions 
remained unanswered. Why did the Partnership have so much latitude to determine its own 
‘successes’? Why could Futuretech get away with delivering apparently more shoddy and less 
customer-focused technology as the relationship developed? Answering these questions 
involves taking retroductive steps ‘backwards’ why the Partnership manifested itself as it did 
and not otherwise.  
At this point existing theory became an invaluable tool to develop a deeper understanding of 
the mechanisms observed. As the data were collected the researchers also trawled the literature 
to see how others theorised cooperative inter-organisational relationships. Various theories 
were considered and combined in the effort to provide a more effective insight into particular 
outcomes observed in the Partnership. Three theories, in particular, appeared to be useful. 
These were transaction cost economics (TCE) which suggests inter-organisational relations are 
affected by the type of product developed and exchanged; resource dependency theory (RDT) 
which suggests inter-organisational relations are affected by each partner’s relative dependency 
on the other’s resources and abilities; and, institutional theory, which suggests inter-
organisational relations can be affected by broader ideological trends and norm-enforcing 
mechanisms. There is not space here to do justice to the complexities of these theoretical 
frameworks or why they were selected. Instead, we explain how these theories were 
incorporated within an explanatory framework for the institutional mechanisms observed. 
Each of these theory resonated with different patterns in the data. Specifically, TCE suggests 
that where contractual mechanisms govern complex, uncertain, changeable, and idiosyncratic 
tasks or undertakings the actors involved will necessarily have greater autonomy in 
determining their own ends. Data from the field confirmed that technologies were developing 
quickly within the market and benchmarks for good performance were ineffective. The form 
of technology that the Partnership acted with thus helped by making a link between something 
within the Partnership and the specific form of its emergence. TCE thus contributed to the 
theoretical model developed because it suggests the relative autonomy that senior managers 
enjoyed within the Partnership has its roots at another level (technological uncertainties). Data, 
such meetings about contractual targets and the high level of contractual delivery, suggest this 
is the case. 
In this case, Suffice to say, a similar story can be told for RDT, which appeared to account for 
the increasingly 'off the peg' technologies Futuretech delivered. Specifically, as Futuretech 
assumed responsibilities for developed technologies, knowledge accrued on Futuretech's side 
of the contract rather than Govco's. As a result, Futuretech’s agents became increasingly 
powerful in asserting their own technological imperative and interests, even if these did not 
meet Govco’s needs exactly. RDT thus contributed to the theoretical model developed, with 
data suggesting Govco (as one entity) became increasingly dependent on Futuretech (as 
another) over time, and that this may have altered the balance of power negotiations about 
technologies developed. Again, this theory fits the data. 
Finally institutional theory, which suggests (institutional) mechanisms are conditioned by 
dominant organising logics that operate across broader social formations, contributed to the 
explanation of the Partnership’s tendency to extol its own successes. At the time of the 
Partnership’s inception, private sector provision was prioritized over public sector provision as 
a matter of policy prescription, owing to a generalized ideological faith in the relative efficiency 
of private sector providers (even where transactional considerations suggested this may not 
actually be the case). In these circumstances, it is unsurprising that few were shouting about 
the Partnership’s failures. 
On this analysis existing theory and the qualitative case data were bought together to suggest 
a theoretical model of the generative mechanism that could account for the specific empirical 
tendencies observed within the case. Arguably, this theoretical model added richness to the 
explanation by rendering more explicit the causal dynamics that existed between the 
Partnership and its antecedents, including the material (e.g. technology/resource) and 
ideational (norms, discourses) phenomena to which it related.  
Theoretical models such as this one are transferable generalisations that can be reapplied in 
analyses of similar institutional settings. More specifically, and in relation to the Partnership, 
the combination of insights about idiosyncratic technical conditions, mutual resource 
dependencies, and a supporting institutional rule system, which inhered within this case, are 
likely to be present in cooperative inter-organizational forms more generally. This model can, 
then, be used as a basis for building alternative explanations of the particular configuration of 
contextual determinants that patinas other similar structures. Knowledge obtained about a 
single case study is thus not confined to the boundaries of the case itself but is theoretically 
transferable across a class of cases. Thus, the theoretical models we develop through our case 
studies, as we explain the peculiarities of our cases, also help articulate the specific conditions 
that makes a class of cases classifiable in terms of their common antecedents. It is this form of 
theoretical generalization that qualitative CR researchers should seek to extend and develop. 
 
Conclusions 
Critical realism provides, in our view, a more serious, consistent and credible alternative to 
positivism, interactionism, sociomaterialism, and constructivism, and allows researchers to 
move beyond the cultural and moral relativism inherent in many of these accounts. Moreover, 
through its commitment to stratification and emergence critical realism is entirely capable of 
incorporating epistemological insights from these competing positions without accepting their 
ontological flaws. This is because critical realism overcomes the objectivist/subjectivist and 
qualitative/quantitative dichotomies, because it is methodologically pluralist and inclusive, and 
because it provides a philosophically informed methodology (abduction and retroduction) for 
generate new insights. 
Yet, critical realism is not without its difficulties. First, as we have shown, it does not (and 
cannot) generate or validate any specific domain level theorising, other than by ensuring that 
studies commit to a stratified, emergent account of the social world. Second, it does not 
prescribe which methods are suitable for investigating which problems. This again, is down to 
the researcher’s experience and intuition. Third, in its ontological guise, critical realism is not 
actually particularly critical. It’s commitment to truth does mean that false beliefs and 
ideologies can be labelled as such but in order to really emancipate, we must do more than 
identify the disempowered. As Collier explains: 
When it is just a set of false beliefs that enslaves, their replacement by true beliefs is 
liberation. But the vast bulk of human bondage, misery and repression is not like that. 
The extension of emancipatory critique from cognitive error to unsatisfied needs makes 
it clear that false belief is not the only chain that binds us . . . unemployed workers, 
homeless families, bullied wives, tortured prisoners, may all know exactly what would 
make them free, but lack the power to get it . . . Hence cognitive enlightenment is a 
necessary, though not a sufficient, condition of their emancipation. (Collier 1998: 461) 
Yet some critical realist are working to develop this limitation. Sayer (2011) and others have 
sought to detail the properties humans possess which imply ethical practices for how they 
should be treated (see Smith 2010; Nussbaum 2006). CR researchers should therefore be 
challenged to consider the means required to act on and change the world (see Ram et al., 
2014). 
Finally, critical realism is relatively difficult to operationalise: many critical realist pieces in 
sociology and organisation studies are compatible with critical realism, but do not end up 
detailing a clear set of entities, properties, causal mechanisms, triggers and so on. Others use 
theorists such as Archer (2003) to provide an applied critical realist framing concerned with 
social structure, agency and reflexivity, which is more suited for social research than a pure 
critical realist ontology. Others, including many Marxists, and Labour Process Theorists, 
undertake studies which do not mention, but are entirely compatible with critical realism. As 
one prominent theorist recently retorted to one of the authors ‘I don’t see why you need to 
mention critical realism, surely it’s just good sociological research!’.  
As a relatively new position, critical realism is still developing: making new connections, re-
interpreting alternative perspectives, and responding to challenges. The work of Bhaskar 
(Bhaskar 2008) on dialectical critical realism, for example, certainly offers opportunities for 
novel research which have not yet been incorporated into mainstream social research. As we 
have seen, this nascence presents challenges to researchers, but also offers them opportunities 
to contribute meaningfully to one of the most important developments in social theory in recent 
times. 
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